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ARE THE SECRECY ORDER COMPENSATION
PROVISIONS OF THE PATENT ACT CONSTITUTIONAL
UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT?
The secrecy order provisions of the Patent Act' raise a number of
issues under the U.S. Constitution. The primary focus of this note is on
the Fifth Amendment issues raised by the Invention Secrecy Act.3
I. HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO
In January of 2002, Inventor discovers that adding coffee grinds to
paraffin results in a cleaner burn. After some experimentation, Inventor
learns that by reacting a particular coffee grind extract with isopropyl
alcohol and then adding the by-product he has named JAVEX to fuel, a
completely clean burning fuel results. Furthermore, the fuel with
JAVEX can be combusted at lower temperatures and pressures.
After further experimentation, Inventor creates a clean and rela-
tively cool burning fuel that is suitable for jet and rocket/missile engines.
Consequently, this new fuel can drastically reduce infrared (IR) signa-
tures by reducing the temperature of the exhaust plume. Therefore,
JAVEX will have significant application in the field of stealth technol-
ogy. Inventor hires a patent attorney in August of 2002 to draft and file
a patent application.
In December of 2002, Inventor files a patent application in the
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office entitled "Jet Fuel Additive." In Febru-
ary of 2003, Inventor receives a Filing Receipt noting that the file is un-
der Security Review. In April of 2003, Inventor receives notification
that his patent application has been placed under secrecy orders after no-
tification by the Department of the Air Force that disclosure of the sub-
1. 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (2000). For background information on the Invention Secrecy Act,
see I Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 1.06 (2006). For a brief discussion of the legislative
history of the compensation provision of the Invention Secrecy Act, section 183, see Gary L.
Hausken, The Value of a Secret: Compensation for Imposition of Secrecy Orders Under the Inven-
tion Secrecy Act, 119 MIL. L. REV. 201, 204-213 (1988).
2. Aside from the obvious First Amendment issues, at least the Fifth Amendment, the Ninth
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment are implicated by various provisions of the Patent Act.
3. 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188.
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ject matter of his patent application could impact national security. Due
to the secrecy orders, Inventor does not receive a foreign filing license.'
Patent prosecution on the merits proceeds 5 and in April of 2005, In-
ventor receives a Notice of Allowance.6 The Notice of Allowance states
that the patent application is in condition for allowance but for the se-
crecy order. Inventor would like to be compensated for his inability to
license his invention and his inability to file foreign patent applications
covering the subject matter of the patent application. Assuming that the
Government uses the invention, Inventor would also like to be compen-
sated for the government use. What amount of money will constitute
just compensation and how will this figure be calculated? Will Inventor
be able to recover this figure and thereby be adequately and justly com-
pensated for the secrecy orders?
II. INTRODUCTION
Before discussing how Inventor may obtain compensation, it is
helpful to understand the number of secrecy orders and trends concern-
ing the imposition of secrecy orders, a basic knowledge of how and
when secrecy orders are imposed, and the ramifications of having a pat-
ent application subject to secrecy orders.
A. Current Trends
The latest statistics available show that as of the end of fiscal year
2006, 4,942 patent applications are subject to secrecy orders with 108
new secrecy orders imposed during fiscal year 2006.' Assuming' that
4. 35 U.S.C. § 184 (2006). In some instances, an inventor may receive what is called a
'Permit A,' allowing foreign filing in certain foreign countries. M.P.E.P. § 120 at 100-22 (8th ed.,
2006). See infra note 21 for a brief summary of the three types of secrecy orders. For purposes of
this hypothetical scenario, it will be assumed that Inventor did not receive a 'Permit A.'
5. After the secrecy orders are imposed, prosecution of the application generally proceeds.
69 C.J.S. Patents § 175 (2006). In extremely rare circumstances, the application will be sealed,
prosecution will be suspended, and no prosecutorial action will occur. Hausken, supra note 1, at
216-17 ("Where the agency believes that even examination of the application may 'jeopardize the
national interest,"...the application will be sealed...")(citing 35 U.S.C. § 183 (2006)).
6. While the notice provided Inventor is not technically a Notice of Allowance in its tradi-
tional sense, courts and legal authorities often refer to the notice as a Notice of Allowance or NOA.
In fact, the notice provided does not require any response from the applicant, but rather places the
application in a "state of suspension until the secrecy order is removed." 69 C.J.S. Patents § 175
(2006).
7. Steven Aftergood, Invention Secrecy Activity, FY 88-FY 06, available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/invention/stats.html (last visited November 15, 2006).
8. Official figures are not yet available for fiscal year 2006.
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approximately 400,000' patent applications were filed in 2006, this
means that about .02% of all patent applications were placed under se-
crecy orders.
Nonetheless, the number of patent applications under secrecy or-
ders is trending generally downward.'" Compare the fiscal year 2006
figures"' with the figures for fiscal year 1989, in which 847 new secrecy
orders were issued and to fiscal year 1991, in which over 6,100 patent
applications were under secrecy orders.
12
The downward trend is more detectable when viewing the number
of new secrecy orders issued and the total number of patent applications
subject to secrecy orders over the time period covering fiscal year 1992
through fiscal year 2001 (excepting the 50% increase in fiscal year
1998)."3
As a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, fiscal year
2002 saw a 75% increase in new secrecy orders (with 139). 1" Since
2002, the rate of imposition of new secrecy orders has generally declined
until a slight increase in fiscal year 2006 of about 1.8%.'
It seems that the issuance of secrecy orders is becoming less fre-
quent since the end of the Cold War, but whether this trend continues
will likely depend upon the general state of world affairs, whether it is
one of war or peace. So, while the imposition of secrecy orders, other
than in the government contractor setting, is fairly rare, as long as there
is one secrecy orders case, the compensation provisions must be fair to
the inventor and to the government.
B. How and When Secrecy Orders are Imposed
All provisional patent applications filed under 35 U.S.C. §
111(b), non-provisional patent applications filed under 35 U.S.C. §
111 (a), and Patent Cooperation Treaty patent applications are reviewed
for any subject matter, that could impact national security if disclosed.'6
9. There were 406,302 patent applications in fiscal year 2005. J. Matthew Buchanan,
USPTO Receives Record Number of Patent and Trademark Applications for 2005, RETHINK(IP),
http://www.rethinkip.com/
rssmojo/archives/uspto-receives-recordnumber of-patent andtrademarkapplications for_200.h
tml
10. Aftergood, supra note 7, at 2-4.
I1. See supra text accompanying note 7.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2000); M.P.E.P. § 115 at 100-22.
2007]
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Such applications are then forwarded to designated departments for a se-
curity review of the subject matter of the patent application.17 The de-
partments are designated by statute and by the President of the United
States. "
If one of the reviewing departments determines that the disclo-
sure of the subject matter of the patent application could impact national
security, the department may notify the Commissioner of Patents,
thereby recommending the imposition of a secrecy order. 9 Upon receiv-
ing such notification, "the Commissioner of Patents shall order that the
invention be kept secret and shall withhold the publication of the appli-
cation or the grant of a patent for such period as the national interest re-
quires, and notify the applicant thereof."2 The secrecy orders2 last for
one year but will be renewed for additional one-year periods if the head
of the department or agency notifies the Commissioner of Patents that
the national interest requires renewal of the secrecy order.22 Secrecy or-
ders imposed during a time of war or national emergency do not expire
until either the cessation of hostilities or six months after the state of na-
tional emergency ends.23
C. The Ramifications of the Imposition of Secrecy Orders
Once secrecy orders are imposed, the inventor is prohibited from
disclosing the subject matter24 of the patent application to any person not
aware of the subject matter of the patent application prior to the date the
secrecy orders were imposed.25  The inventor may file a petition chal-
17. 35 U.S.C. § 181.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. While secrecy orders are referred to in the statute and in this paper in a general sense,
there actually are three different types of secrecy orders.
Weiss v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 2d 113, 126 (D. Mass. 2001)(referring to "the three types of
secrecy orders issued by the Patent Office")(citing M.P.E.P. § 120, at 100-12 to 100-13 (7th ed,
2000)). The M.P.E.P. sets forth:
(A) Secrecy Order and Permit for Foreign Filing in Certain Countries, (B) Secrecy Order and Permit
for Disclosing Classified, and (C) Secrecy Order. MP.E.P. § 120, at 100-12 to 100-13 (8th ed.,
2006). In order to examine the operation of the statute in its entirety, "secrecy orders" as used in
this paper will refer to the type C secrecy orders without a 'Permit A.'
22. 35 U.S.C. § 183.
23. Id.
24. The statute's use of the words "subject matter" necessarily broadens its coverage. The
statute covers the subject matter of the invention, not the disclosure included in the patent applica-
tion itself.
25. 35 U.S.C. § 186 (2000); M.P.E.P. § 120, at 100-26.
[1:275
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lenging the imposition of secrecy orders.26 If the petition is denied, the
inventor may appeal within sixty days to the Secretary of Commerce.27
One who willfully violates the secrecy order will likely have his
patent application held abandoned, lose his right to compensation, be
barred from receiving a patent and may be subject to a substantial fine
and up to two years in prison.28 It should be noted that this prohibition
extends to patent practitioners not aware of the subject matter of the pat-
ent application prior to the imposition of secrecy orders,29 a point that
may be important during any subsequent legal proceedings.
After the imposition of secrecy orders, prosecution on the merits
proceeds until the application is in condition for allowance.3" The in-
ventor is allowed to file responses to Office Actions in the standard pro-
cedural manner.31 If prosecution proceeds to the point that an appeal is
necessary, the inventor must file a notice of appeal and the appeal brief,
but no hearing will be scheduled until the secrecy orders are lifted.32
An application that is in condition for allowance but for a secrecy
order, will not issue until the Commissioner lifts the secrecy order.33
This condition may continue for an extended period of time. Two re-
ported cases concerned patent applications that were under secrecy or-
ders for over twenty-six years.34 In fact, secrecy orders may be kept in
26. 37 C.F.R. § 5.4 (2006).
27. Id. But, a dissatisfied inventor may not appeal to the Secretary of Commerce until the pe-
tition under 37 C.F.R. § 5.4 is made and denied.
28. See 35 U.S.C. § 182 (2000)(providing abandonment for unauthorized disclosure of the
subject matter of a patent application under secrecy orders, including any disclosure in any publica-
tion or a foreign patent application filing); 35 U.S.C. §184 (prohibits the foreign filing of a patent
application prior to the grant of a foreign filing license and provides that a foreign filing license will
not be granted in the case of a patent application under secrecy orders); 35 U.S.C. § 185 (2000)(bars
the grant of a patent if a foreign patent application is filed without having first obtained a foreign
filing license pursuant to § 184); 35 U.S.C. § 186 (2000)(provides penalties for knowingly violating
a secrecy order).
29. 35 U.S.C. § 186 (prohibiting disclosure without any attomey-client exception unless 'due
authorization' is granted).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 181; 37 C.F.R. § 5.3 (2006); and see generally e.g., 69 C.J.S. Patents § 175
(2006), 60 Am.Jur.2d Patents § 742 (2006), Hausken, supra note l, at 216.
31. However, special mailboxes and requirements apply to the submissions in response to
Office Actions, e.g., some levels of secrecy orders require hand delivery and some require special
notations on the envelope, etc. 37 C.F.R. § 5.1 (2006). Also, due to the special handling require-
ments, the applicant will ordinarily be given the full statutory time limit (six months) within which
to respond to an Office Action. M.P.E.P. § 130 at 100-28.
32. 37 C.F.R. § 5.3 (2006).
33. 35 U.S.C. § 181.
34. Stein v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 2d 265, 266 (D. Mass. 2001)(Stein was assigned a
patent application that was under secrecy orders for just under 27 years; from April 9, 1973 to
March 22, 2000); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 360, 361 (Ct. Cl.
1982)(Secrecy orders were in effect for over 26 years; from April 14, 1949 until June 13, 1975). It
2007]
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place indefinitely if national security requires.35
D. How an Applicant Seeks Compensation
The Patent Act gives applicants the right to seek compensation
for the imposition of secrecy orders and/or the use of the invention by
the Government.
3 6
The window to seek compensation opens when the applicant is no-
tified that the application is in a condition for allowance except for the
secrecy orders.37 The applicant then has until six years38 after a patent
issues from the application to apply for compensation.39 The application
for compensation is made to the head of the department or agency that
caused issuance of the secrecy orders, not to the Commissioner of Pat-
ents who actually imposed the secrecy order.4"
The head of the department or agency is authorized by statute to
enter into negotiations with the applicant or his successors, assignees or
representatives to enter into an agreement in full settlement for the dam-
age or use.4 If settlement cannot be effected, the Patent Act authorizes
the "head of the department or agency [to] award and pay to [the claim-
ant] a sum not exceeding 75 per centum of the sum which the head of
the department or agency considers just compensation for the damage
and/or use."42 There is no statutory guidance as to what amount of nego-
tiations are required before the department head may determine that "set-
tlement cannot be effected."43 There is also no statutory guidance as to
how the figure representing "just compensation"" is calculated.
is possible that much longer periods of time have lapsed with respect to other patent applications
and that the secrecy orders have not yet been lifted, no suit was brought or the inventor assigned the
invention to the government or abandoned the invention, etc.
35. As long as the secrecy orders are renewed each year, there is nothing in the Invention Se-
crecy Act that sets a time limit for secrecy orders. 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188.
36. 35 U.S.C. § 183 (2000)(setting forth the right to compensation and the procedural process
of obtaining compensation for damages incurred as a result of the imposition of secrecy orders).
37. Id.
38. Sen. Rpt. 82-1001 at 1323 (Oct. 16, 1951)(explaining that the 6-year statute of limitations
in H.R. 4687 was "incorporated to preclude the collection of old suits").
39. 35 U.S.C. § 183.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id
44. 35 U.S.C. § 183.
[1:275
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E. Inventor's Options in Seeking Compensation
Returning to the hypothetical scenario, Inventor now is in a position
to seek compensation under the Patent Act since his patent application is
in condition for allowance, "except for the secrecy orders. 45 Under 35
U.S.C. § 183, Inventor can pursue compensation for the damages caused
by the secrecy orders or governmental use (if any occurred) in one of
two procedurally distinct manners.46 The distinction between these two
procedural approaches is in the point at which the remedy is available.47
As a first approach, Inventor may seek administrative remedies48
once Inventor receives notification that the application is in condition for
allowance "except for the secrecy orders."4 9  Inventor may present a
claim to the head of the Department of the Air Force for compensation
for the damage resulting from the imposition of the secrecy orders."
After Inventor presents his claim to the head of the Department of the
Air Force, he can enter into negotiations with the department head to ne-
gotiate a settlement." If Inventor believes the negotiated amount is fair,
he can take the amount offered as full settlement which "shall be conclu-
sive for all purposes..." 52 In other words, after the agreed-upon amount
is paid, Inventor will not be allowed to renegotiate a settlement 3 even if
Inventor later learns that his invention was worth a great deal more than
he previously believed. 4
In the event that Inventor and the Air Force cannot reach an agree-
45. Id.
46. Id.; Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 231 Ct. Cl. at 363 (quoting Constant v. United States, 223 Ct.
Cl. 148, 153 (1980)); Hausken, supra note 1, at 222 (noting that "The [ISA] contemplates two sepa-
rate procedures").
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 35 U.S.C. § 183.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. As an example, consider a situation in which Inventor agrees to a settlement and then dis-
covers that JAVEX is suitable as an additive to internal combustion engines, including automobile
engines. Furthermore, Inventor finds that automobiles run on fuel with JAVEX achieve higher gas
mileage and produce fewer emissions with, of course, the benefits of better performance. 35 U.S.C.
§ 183 disallows Inventor's filing of a second claim to attempt to recover these damages if full set-
tlement has occurred. This type of scenario probably does not raise a constitutional question. The
Supreme Court has noted that the measure of damages for a 'taking' is measured at the time of the
taking; in other words, the measure is what the affected party gives, not what the government re-
ceives. See e.g. Brown v. Legal Found., 538 U.S. 216, 235-36 (U.S. 2003). In the hypothetical sce-
nario, Inventor gave and was compensated for a jet fuel additive. The government got a jet fuel ad-
ditive and an automobile fuel additive.
2007]
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ment,55 the Patent Act authorizes the department head to award and pay
"a sum not exceeding 75 per centum of the sum which the head of the
department or agency considers just compensation., 56
Pursuit of this first approach may be advantageous to Inventor in
that Inventor may pursue compensation while the application is still
pending;57 the statute does not require Inventor to wait for a patent to is-
sue to pursue compensation." However, the first approach also carries
with it a degree of risk.
Under this first procedural approach, after Inventor presents his
claim to the Air Force, he must either accept an award from the Air
Force, receive no answer (or offer for negotiations) from the Air Force,
or be told that there will be no settlement offered by the Air Force.59
Until the Air Force provides (or fails to provide) one of these three re-
sponses, Inventor will not be deemed as having exhausted his adminis-
trative remedies, a condition that courts have found must be satisfied un-
der 35 U.S.C. § 183 prior to filing a suit in the U.S. Court of Claims.6"
After one of these three events occurs, Inventor may file a claim in the
U.S. Court of Claims or in the District Court in which the inventor re-
sides, for "an amount which when added to the award shall constitute
just compensation for the damage and/or use of the invention by the
Government.
'
,
61
Plaintiff inventors have fared poorly while pursuing judicial review
of administrative handling of compensation claims filed under this first
approach, often meeting dismissal under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6),62 for failure
55. 35 U.S.C. § 183 (sets forth the procedure in the event that "full settlement cannot be ef-
fected").
56. Id.
57. Id. As discussed earlier, the patent application must be in condition for allowance except
for the secrecy orders, which prevent the patent from issuing. See supra notes 30-37, and accompa-
nying text.
58. Id.
59. Constant v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 629, 635 (Ct. Cl. 1989)(Constant asserted that ex-
haustion had occurred since the Navy "has failed or declines to make a settlement."). The court in
Constant ruled that the Navy had not yet declined to make a settlement and therefore Constant had
not yet exhausted his administrative remedies. Id. at 635-636. Hornback, 40 Fed. Cl. at 528 ("[in a
suit filed before the patent issues,] Section 183 requires that the applicant first seek relief and obtain
a decision from the agency that issued the secrecy order.); Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 231 Ct. Cl. at 363
("an applicant may obtain judicial consideration under this first route where no relief is granted by
the agency").
60. Chisum, supra note 1, at § 1.06 (citing Hornback v. United States, 46 USPQ2d 1304,
1307-08 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 1998), affd 178 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (unpublished) and citing Hom-
back v. United States, 40 USPQ2d 1694, 1696 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 1996)); and see supra note 58.
61. 35 U.S.C. § 183.
62. Or its basically identical counterpart, R.C.F.C. 12(b)(6), the Court of Federal Claims
equivalent in text and in operation.
(1:275
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to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and/or for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.63
Therefore, it may be wise for Inventor to seek compensation using
the second procedural option' 4 available to Inventor under 35 U.S.C. §
183. The second approach also entails a degree of risk; Inventor must
wait until the secrecy orders are lifted and a patent issues on the patent
application that was under secrecy orders65 before a suit under the sec-
ond approach may be filed. An inventor seeking compensation under
this second procedural approach faces the risk that the secrecy orders
will remain in place for a extended time66, or even indefinitely.67 Inven-
tor's only recourse is to file a petition under 37 C.F.R. § 5.4 and an ap-
peal to the Secretary of Commerce if the petition is denied.68
Using this approach, Inventor avoids seeking administrative reme-
dies directly from the department or agency that requested the imposi-
tion of secrecy orders. 69 The Inventor may file a claim for compensation
in the U.S. Court of Claims from the time the patent issues until six
years after the patent issues.7"
III. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
The hypothetical scenario of Inventor raises several Fifth Amend-
ment issues arising from application of the Invention Secrecy Act. It is
to these issues that the remainder of this paper is directed.
While some courts and scholars7' have said it is clear that the impo-
63 . Courts reason that all administrative remedies must be exhausted. 35 U.S.C. § 183. The
Court of Federal Claims will not have jurisdiction under section 183 until the administrative reme-
dies are exhausted, or the patent has issued. See supra note 59.
64. 35 U.S.C. § 183; Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 231 Ct. Cl. at 363 (quoting Constant, 223 Ct. Cl. at
153). Weiss, 146 F.Supp.2d 113, Clift v. United States, 808 F.Supp. 101 (D. Conn. 1991); Stein v.
United States, 41 F.Supp.2d 68 (D. Mass. 1999); Hornback, 40 Fed. Cl. at 524.
65. Id.
66. While the secrecy orders only last one year, secrecy orders are easily renewed for addi-
tional one-year periods, and nothing limits the number of times this renewal may occur. 35 U.S.C.
181; and see Stein, 135 F. Supp. 2d at 266 (involving a patent application under secrecy orders for
over 26 years ).
67. It is possible that such a case exists, but is not reported.
68. 37 C.F.R. § 5.4.
69. For a discussion of the statute of limitations of Section 183, and to see how the statute of
limitations is applied, see Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 231 Ct. Cl. at 362-370; 35 U.S.C. §§ 181, 183.
70. Chisum, supra note 1, at § 1.06. Also, see supra note 45. Also, note that the patent term
is extended one day for each day an application is under secrecy orders. 35 U.S.C. §
154(b)(1)(C)(2006).
71. Weiss, 146 F.Supp. 2d at 124, affd Weiss v. United States, 37 Fed. Appx. 518, 521 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)(noting that "[i]t is settled that 'the issuance of a secrecy order is not per se a taking and
that diminution of [an] invention and inability to exploit [the] invention are compensable elements
of a claim under section 183, not under the Fifth Amendment."')(quoting Constant, 16 Cl. Ct. at
2007]
9
Citrin: Patent Secrecy Orders and the Fifth Amendment
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL
sition of secrecy orders, in and of itself, does not effect a taking within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, there are several provisions of the
Invention Secrecy Act that arguably allow for a taking in violation of the
Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution; e.g., "...nor shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compensation. ''7
First, does the Invention Secrecy Act allow for a taking of private
property rights in that an applicant whose patent application is subject to
secrecy orders may be legally barred from filing a foreign patent appli-
cation covering the subject matter of the U.S. patent application that is
subject to secrecy orders? 73  When the secrecy order is lifted, at least
one year later, the ability to file a foreign patent application may be lost
forever. 74  To restate this issue another way, does the secrecy-order-
induced forfeiture of foreign filing rights constitute a taking?
Second, does the Invention Secrecy Act allow a taking of private
property rights in that an applicant whose patent application is subject to
secrecy orders may be legally barred from discussing or otherwise dis-
closing75 the subject matter of the patent application to any person un-
aware of the subject matter of the patent application prior to the imposi-
tion of secrecy orders? In such a scenario, the inventor or assignee is
prohibited from discussing the application with anyone not aware of the
invention prior to the imposition of secrecy orders. Do the secrecy-
order-induced losses of commercial gain constitute a taking?
To answer the first two questions, a third question must be exam-
ined: does the Invention Secrecy Act compensation provision provide an
inventor just compensation76 for all of his losses, including foreign filing
634-35, affd, Constant v. United States, 884 F.2d 1398 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). This case, however,
glosses over the situation in which 35 U.S.C. § 183 fails to provide adequate remedy to an inventor.
Some scholars assert that secrecy orders are not classifiable as exercise of eminent domain. Cour-
tenay C. Brinckerhoff, Medical Method Patents and the Fifth Amendment: Do the New Limits on
Enforceability Effect a Taking?, 4 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 147, 151 (1996); Hausken, supra
note 1, at 228-243 (1988). Instead, some would classify secrecy orders as within the government's
police powers. Id. at 243. This proposition is based upon patent applications not being classifiable
as personal property. Id. and see Jean 0. Lanjouw, A New Global Patent Regime for Diseases: U.S.
and International Legal Issues, 16 HARV. J. LAW & TEC. 85, 99 (2002). As will be discussed, infra
note 83 and accompanying text, this reasoning is flawed.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
73. 35 U.S.C. § 184.
74. 35 U.S.C. § 181 (barring the filing of any foreign patent applications without a foreign
filing license); see also International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 4, C,
1, March 20, 1883, [hereinafter Paris Convention] (limiting the one-year grace period within which
to file a patent application claiming priority to a patent application in a member state to twelve
months for utility patent applications and six months for design patent applications).
75. 35 U.S.C. § 186.
76. 35 U.S.C. § 183.
[1:275
10
Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 1 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol1/iss2/3
PATENT SECRECY ORDERS AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
rights and lost commercial gain? Of particular pertinence to this ques-
tion is that under section 183, the department or agency head is author-
ized to "award and pay" an amount not exceeding "75 per centum" of
what the department or agency head deems to be 'just compensation.' 77
This provision raises two Fifth Amendment issues: why does the statute
authorize the "head of the department or agency [that is responsible for
the imposition of secrecy orders]" to unilaterally determine what is "just
compensation?" 78 Furthermore, once this "just compensation" figure is
unilaterally calculated, does the statute, prima facie, unconstitutionally
authorize a taking of 25 per centum of this amount that the statute rec-
ognizes as "just compensation?, 79
Prior to addressing these three individual takings questions, a
threshold question8 0 must first be answered, namely, whether a patent,
and more particularly a patent application, is properly classified as a pri-
vate property right under the Fifth Amendment.81  After this question
has been answered in the affirmative, the several Fifth Amendment
questions may be addressed.
A. Are Patent Applications Private Property?
Section 261 of the Patent Act states that "Subject to the provi-
sions of this title, patents shall have the attributes of personal prop-
erty." 2 Courts have addressed whether issued patents are private prop-
erty and have generally ruled in the affirmative.83 There is little or no
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (emphasis added). Since the department or agency head is authorized to "award and
pay an amount not to exceed 75 per centum."
80. While a taking also requires that the property be taken for public use, there can be little
question that the use of the invention by the government, or the imposition of secrecy to protect na-
tional security both qualify as "public use."
81. Grover v. United States, 73 Fed. Appx. 401, 404 (Fed. Cir. 2003)(noting that"[a] thresh-
old test for evaluating a takings claim is to determine whether the claimant has a property interest in
what he has allegedly lost. ")(quoting Conti v. United States, 291 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
82. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006).
83. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Bd. V. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642
(2002)(stating that "[p]atents... have long been considered a species of property."); Aptix Corp. v.
Quickturn Design Sys., 269 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001)(stating that in "the absence of any
showing of misconduct before the PTO, an issued patent will remain a 'presumptively valid grant of
personal property."'); Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2000)(noting that "an issued patent constitutes property"). College Sav. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998)(stating "[t]hat a patent is
property, protected against appropriation both by individuals and government, has long been settled.
A patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land. It is beyond reasonable debate
that patents are property."), rev'd in part on other grounds; Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Ex-
pense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Schenck v. Nortron Corp., 713 F.2d 782, 786
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question that an issued patent is a property right within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment. However, while these cases are instructive, they
are not directly applicable to the subject of secrecy orders since secrecy
orders apply to patent applications, not to issued patents.84
Courts have not conclusively ruled on this question to date.
However, it is clear that patent applications are considered private prop-
erty to at least some degree.85 For example, the Code of Federal Regula-
tions and the United States Code discuss the alienability of rights in a
patent application.86 While the ability to assign rights to a patent appli-
cation suggests a private property right, it is known that one can assign
rights that do not yet exist; e.g., assigning rights to payment under a con-
tract or in a tort case. Notwithstanding this fact, the Regulations discuss
the "transfer... of its right, title and interest in a ... patent application."87
The Regulation could read "right, title or interest in a." This would sup-
port the argument that the Regulation is referring to patents and trade-
n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1983)(stating "[t]he patent right is but the right to exclude others, the very definition
of 'property."'); Exxon Chem. Patents v. Lubrizol Corp., 935 F.2d 1263, 1268-1269 (Fed. Cir.
199 l)(asserting that the 1952 Patent Act resolved conflicting precedent by defining patents as per-
sonal property)(vacated and remanded on other grounds by 137 F.3d 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998)); Patlex
Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985)(stating that "[l]t is beyond reasonable
debate that patents are property... patent property rights... fall squarely within both classical and
judicial definitions of protectable property."); Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 966-
69 (Ct. Cl. 1979)(affirming that patents are property and therefore subject to the principles of emi-
nent domain). Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. Wallace A. Erickson & Co., 627 F.2d 57, 59, (7th Cir.
1980) (stating that "[t]he seventeen-year exclusion is a.. property right... of which the patentee can-
not be deprived without due process of law."); Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898, 914 (6th Cir.
1978)(stating that "[t]he patent right, solely that of excluding others, is the fundamental element of
all human rights called "property."); Beasley v. Avery Dennison Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
18862 (D. Tex. 2006)(defining patents as "personal property"); Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v.
Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 643 (1947)(asserting that "[a] patent is a species of property.");
James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356 (1881)(stating that a "...patent...confers.. .an exclusive property
in the patented invention"). Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225, 226 (1876)(stating that "[a patent
holder's rights are] as much entitled to protection as any other property"); Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v.
Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876)(stating that "a patent for an invention is as much property as a patent
for land.").
84. 35 U.S.C. § 181 (stating that the Commissioner shall withhold publication of the applica-
tion or grant of a patent on a patent application in condition for allowance if national security re-
quires).
85. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006)(stating that rights in patent applications are assignable).
86. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (stating "Applications for patent...or any interest therein, shall be assign-
able in law.. The applicant.. may... grant and convey an exclusive right under his application for
patent..."); 37 C.F.R. § 3.1 (2006) (stating "Assignment means a transfer by a party of all or part of
its right, title and interest in a patent, patent application, registered mark or a mark for which an ap-
plication to register has been filed.")(emphasis in original); Figueroa v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl.
488, 502-503 (Ct. Cl. 2003)(stating that "the fee associated with 'recording each assignment,
agreement or other paper relating to the property in a patent or application')(quoting 37 C.F.R.§
1.21 (2006))(emphasis added).
87. 37. C.F.R. § 3.1.
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marks when the words "right" and "title" are used. "Interest" then could
be read as referring to a patent application. However, this interpretation
would be inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, which
strongly implies that "right" and "interest" modifies all types of intellec-
tual property listed: "patents, patent applications...," etc. If this inter-
pretation of the statute is correct, then an assignment of a patent applica-
tion is a real transfer of property in the traditional sense, not some future
or conditional transfer of rights. This interpretation is consistent with
the plain meaning of the statute. Furthermore, a patent application that
is never allowed does not contradict this reading; the 'rights' and 'title'
transferred were valid transfers. The problem is that there were no rights
and the title is basically of no value.
If property rights exist in patent applications, at what point in the
application process do property rights accrue to the owner or assignee?
In Figueroa v. United States, the Federal Court of Claims consid-
ered whether the plaintiff possessed a property right in an issued patent
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment.88 The court discussed patent ap-
plications and asserted that "....property interest in a patent accrues only
after it has satisfied all mandatory conditions. Prior to that... [an appli-
cant] does not have a recognizable property interest..."89 Perhaps the
court meant this statement to apply to any patent application that has not
yet issued as a patent. However, the language is imprecise; a patent ap-
plication under secrecy orders that would issue "except...for"9 the se-
crecy orders has satisfied all of the mandatory conditions: utility, nov-
elty, nonobviousness, and so forth.91
Looking back to the facts of Figueroa, Figueroa did not satisfy
the conditions of the patent system; he had not paid the requisite mainte-
nance fees.92 The court's determination that the owner of a patent appli-
cation has no preexisting property right until all of the requirements are
met was retroactively applied.93 Therefore, the patent grant was termi-
nated.94 So, Figueroa may be instructive, but it too is not conclusive
unless the absence of secrecy orders is viewed as a pre-existing require-
88. 57 Fed. Cl. 488.
89. Id. at 502.
90. 35 U.S.C. § 183.
91. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq.
92. Id. at 502-503.
93. Id. at 502.
94. Id.(explaining why a Fifth Amendment claim should fail under these circumstances since
"it is not that...personal property is taken away ... but rather the conditions of the privilege are no
longer satisfied.")(citing 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2)).
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ment of the patent system.95
If the absence of secrecy orders is a condition precedent, then a pat-
ent application under secrecy orders has not fulfilled all of the manda-
tory requirements of the patent system. In such a case, it would seem
that Figueroa should apply and that an applicant has no Fifth Amend-
ment claim.1
6
This is difficult to accept because the patent applicant has satisfied
the mandatory requirements of the patent act; it is conditions out of his
control that prevent the grant of a patent.97 It is the government that re-
fuses to allow the patent to issue; not a failure on the part of the appli-
cant. Courts have not addressed this problem directly, but have recog-
nized that the applicant should not be penalized for events beyond his
control.98
Of the other main categories of intellectual property, trade secrets
are the most similar to patents. 99 Trade secrets may cover an invention,
not simply an expression of an invention or a source of an invention. 0
The Supreme Court has said that trade secrets are property within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.' The Court cited several aspects
of trade secrets that dictated this finding.'0 2 First, trade secrets are as-
signable.0 3  Second, trade secrets can form the res of a trust. 0 4 Finally,
trade secrets may be transferred to a trustee in bankruptcy.0 5
95. Some suggest that the Patent Act should be rephrased to codify the view that the absence
of secrecy orders is required for the patent to issue. Hausken, supra note 1, at 254 (proposing that
"[The Invention Secrecy Act] should be viewed as a condition precedent to the issuance of the pat-
ent."). Then, this requirement would apply to each application and would be viewed as another re-
quirement of the patent system as explained above.
96. Figueroa, 57 Fed. Cl. at 505 (issuing summary judgment disposing of the plaintiff's Fifth
Amendment claim).
97. 35 U.S.C. § 183 (limiting the time period at which compensation may be sought to the
point in time that "[the application is in condition for allowance] except for [the secrecy orders]").
98. See e.g. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 231 Ct. Cl. at 370 (stating that "it was not plaintiffs' own
actions which produced a 22-year delay [from the time that the application was in condition for al-
lowance to the time the plaintiff filed suit]," suggesting that courts will have less patience for a de-
lay caused by the plaintiff/inventor).
99. See Hausken, supra note 1, at 231-233 for a discussion on trade secrets and whether or
not a trade secret may be classified as property for Fifth Amendment analysis.
100. Copyrights and trademarks, respectively.
101. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-04 (1984).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1002 (citing Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 401-
402 (1911); Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 225 (2nd Cir. 1971)).
104. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 82, Comment e (1959), which reads "[a]
trade secret can be held in trust.").
105. Id. (citing In re Uniservices, Inc., 517 F.2d 492, 496-97 (7th Cir. 1975))(evaluating the
debtor's trade secrets as to whether their secrecy was complete and therefore constituted property of
the debtor).
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Patent applications, like trade secrets, are assignable.' °6 Patent ap-
plications can form the res of a trust.0 7 Also, patent applications may be
transferred to a trustee in bankruptcy.0 8 So, three of the reasons cited by
the Supreme Court as proof that trade secrets are personal property also
apply to patent applications.
Still, some scholars feel that there are no true property rights in
patent applications until a patent issues. 9 Lanjouw asserts that any
"taking" of a patent application (by imposition of secrecy orders) is
"prospective" since "the property rights in question do not yet exist."" 0
Hausken also believes that no property rights exist until a patent is-
sues. 
11
'
While a patent applicant does not have the power to enjoin others
from practicing his invention until his patent issues, the power to prevent
others from receiving patent protection may exist from the moment the
patent application is filed."2 So, there is some statutory exclusivity that
results when a patent application is filed. This is minimally persuasive.
However, trade secret law provides a much more compelling argument
and proves that a patent application is personal property for purposes of
the Fifth Amendment.
Hausken actually looks to trade secret law and the Ruckelhaus case
and cites both as proof that patent applications are not private prop-
erty. 13 Hausken noted that the Ruckelhaus court had limited its holding
to those cases in which "federal law created an expectation that [an]
agency would keep the data confidential."'"' Hausken later asserts that
the protection under Ruckelhaus (i.e. Monsanto) ceases when a patent
applicant decides not to keep his invention secret and applies for a pat-
106. See supra note 86.
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 82, Comment c (reading "[a] patent or copyright
can be held in trust.").
108. See Keen, Inc. v. Gecker, 264 F. Supp. 2d 659 (N.D. 11. 2003); 11 U.S.C. §
iOl(35A)(C)(defining intellectual property as including patent applications); Watson v. H.J. Heinz
Co., 101 Fed. Appx. 823 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (implying that patent applications are included in property
transferred to the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541).
109. Lanjouw, supra note 72, at 99 (proposing that "the property rights in question do not yet
exist"); Hausken, supra note 1, at 240 (proposing that "no property is lost [when a patent applica-
tion is placed under secrecy orders] because none existed").
110. Lanjouw, supra note 72, at 99.
111. Hausken, supra note 1, at 240.
112. 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). This applies to a patent applicant who files a patent application be-
fore another inventor invents the same invention. Id. Theoretically, an inventor could invent and
file on the same day. As long as that filing precedes the second inventor, 102(e) will operate to pre-
vent the grant of a patent to the second inventor.
113. 119 Mil. L. Rev. at 231-34.
114. Id.at233.
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ent. 115
When the applicant voluntarily applies for a patent, he does so
knowing that the patent will eventually publish and the invention will
thereby be disclosed to the public." 6 Hausken writes, however, that if a
patent application is submitted with an "express guarantee of confidenti-
ality," then the protection afforded by Ruckelhaus would apply to a pat-
ent application under secrecy orders. 1
7
Hausken's reasoning is flawed for one simple reason; patent appli-
cations are submitted with an express guarantee of confidentiality."
8
This expectation generally lasts at least 18 months (at which time a pat-
ent application is published), or until issuance of a patent if a non-
publication request is filed with the patent application and no foreign fil-
ing occurs. 19 If secrecy orders are in place, then that expectation of se-
crecy would not only continue, it justifiably would be greater. After all,
the applicant is barred from disclosing the subject matter of the patent
application; a restriction that does not usually apply to a patent applicant.
As such, the government also may not disclose the subject matter of the
patent application for the same period of time. It should be noted that it
is quite common in certain 'hi-tech' industries for companies to apply
for a patent with a non-publication request and to maintain the invention
as a trade secret until the patent issues or the company decides to file a
foreign patent application. In such a scenario, the confidential patent
application may be abandoned prior to allowance and the trade secret
may be kept confidential indefinitely.
Therefore, Hausken's understanding of Ruckelhaus dictates that
patent applications are afforded the protection of Ruckelhaus, contrary to
the conclusion reached in the article. 2 ' In fact, though Hausken ex-
pressly states a contrary rule, the reasoning supports this author's analy-
sis.
For these reasons, this author believes that a court considering this
issue for the first time will hold that patent applications are private per-
sonal property for purposes of the Fifth Amendment. A contrary hold-
ing would require the overruling of Ruckelhaus.
Assuming that a court finds that a patent application is property
115. Id. at 234.
116. Id. at 240-41.
117. Id. at 240.
118. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2006) (stating that "applications for patents shall be kept in confidence
by the Patent and Trademark Office and no information concerning the same given without author-
ity of the applicant or owner")(emphasis added).
119. Id.
120. Hausken, supra note 1, at 240.
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within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, the compensation provi-
sion l"' of the Invention Secrecy Act, 122 as well as the other limitations
imposed by the Invention Secrecy Act, must comply with the safeguards
included in the Fifth Amendment.
Returning now to the hypothetical case of Inventor, can Inventor
seek compensation for the loss of foreign filing rights due to the delay of
the secrecy orders?
B. Lost Foreign Filing Rights Due to Foreign Filing Restrictions
Under the Paris Convention, a utility patent application applicant
has a one-year grace period within which to file a foreign patent claim-
ing priority from a parent patent application.2 3 This grace period lasts
six months for design patent applications.2
4
Inventor has lost the ability to file for patent protection interna-
tionally. These lost filing rights were the direct result of the govern-
ment's imposition of secrecy orders, thereby prohibiting inventor from
filing any foreign patent applications. 125 Were Inventor's foreign filing
rights "taken" in violation of the Fifth Amendment?
Congress recognized that foreign filing rights may be lost when
secrecy orders are imposed, but intended for those losses to be compen-
sated under section 183.126 So, the question is not whether these losses
have occurred, but rather whether Inventor will be adequately compen-
sated for this loss. This issue is discussed below.
C. Lost Commercial Gain Due to Obsolescence
As with lost foreign filing rights, the issue to consider when ad-
dressing Inventor's lost commercial gain is whether Inventor will be
adequately compensated for his damages. Calculating a figure that
represents lost commercial gain due to obsolescence and inability to li-
cense an invention will be impossible to accurately and concretely quan-
tify. Therefore, Inventor's commercial losses will likely never be com-
pensated. This issue is more apparent when considering "just
compensation."
121. 35 U.S.C. § 183.
122. 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-88.
123. Paris Convention, art 4, C, 1.
124. Id.
125. 35 U.S.C. § 184.
126. Sen. Rpt. 82-1001 at 1324.
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IV. "JUST COMPENSATION" UNDER SECTION 183 OF THE INVENTION
SECRECY ACT
Section 183 of the Invention Secrecy Act authorizes the head of
the agency or department that initiated the secrecy orders to enter into
negotiations "in full settlement for the damage [caused by the imposition
of secrecy orders] and/or use [of the invention by the government]. ' 27
In the event that "full settlement of the claim cannot be effected," sec-
tion 183 provides that Inventor will be paid based upon what the head of
the department or agency considers "just compensation" for the damage
and/or use.
12 8
The statute is silent as to how "just compensation" should be cal-
culated, but it seems from the statute that such a calculation is made
solely by the department or agency that was responsible for the secrecy
orders in the first place. 1
29
Why does this statute ignore inventors' rights to fair and just com-
pensation by authorizing the department or agency head to assign a
value representing "just compensation?"' 30 Some may fear that a figure
representing "just compensation"'' may be artificially lowered by the
department due to budgeting constraints or other considerations.
Therefore, while on its face the statute uses the phrase "just com-
pensation, ' it is at least at issue whether or not the figure assigned will
truly represent "just compensation."' 33
A. 75 Per Centum of "Just Compensation"
Notwithstanding the method of determining what constitutes "just
compensation," discussed supra, and assuming that the compensation
owed Inventor as determined by the department or agency is just, 134 sec-
tion 183 authorizes the agency to pay "a sum not exceeding 75 per cen-
tum," i.e., to withhold 25 per centum of this figure. 35 Not only is this
127. 35 U.S.C. § 183.
128. Id.
129. Id. (allowing payment of "the sum which the head of the department or agency considers
just compensation"). Even if the head of the department or agency bases this figure upon the prior
negotiations with the applicant, the statute authorizes the head to assign this figure without the ap-
proval of any other entity. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 35 U.S.C. § 183.
133. Id.
134. This author has doubts as to whether such figure will (or even can) be "just" as contem-
plated by the Fifth Amendment.
135. Id.
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taking possible, it is mandated by the statute! 3 6  Without reading any
further, 35 U.S.C. § 183, on its face, allows for a taking of personal
property without just compensation in direct violation of the Fifth
Amendment. Congress worked around this obvious problem by allowing
a dissatisfied claimant to "bring [a post-deprivation] suit against the
United States in.. .court... for an amount which when added to the award
"'137shall constitute just compensation...
The Supreme Court has said that post-deprivation judicial or ad-
ministrative review satisfies Due Process requirements as long as the
proceedings are "meaningful and fair.'13  Will a claimant seeking to
quantify "just compensation" under section 183 receive a "meaningftl
and fair" trial?
B. Why Does Section 183 Mandate This Procedure
The legislative history'39 of section 183 and the statute 4 ° itself are
silent as to any possible justification for requiring a displeased claimant
to go to court to receive the remaining 25 per centum of the owed "just
compensation."' 41  Had the statute mandated that the department or
agency "award and pay a sum the head or agency considers just compen-
sation," and then allow a displeased claimant to seek judicial review of
that amount, then perhaps there would not exist such a staring question.
Such a statute, on its face at least, would require the department or
agency to pay the complete amount it ostensibly owes the claimant.
136. Id. (setting limits on the compensation by stating that the Head "may pay.. .a sum not ex-
ceeding...").
137. Id. (emphasis added).
138. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (U.S. 1976)(noting that "[s]ome form of hearing
is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest.")(quoting Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558 (1974)); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)(noting
that "[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner."').
139. The entire legislative history of the Invention Secrecy Act is not readily available. How-
ever, it appears that hearings lasted "a day or less." Hausken, supra note 1, 209-13 (1988). Discus-
sion in those hearings covered the types of damages that could be recovered and the burden of proof
required. Id. Apparently, the exact extent of what damages can be recovered and the burden of
proof were never clearly answered. Id.
Congress recognized that proving damages would be difficult, if not impossible, since damages may
be completely speculative. Id. Nonetheless, Congress apparently decided in the end to let the
courts figure out how best to handle these problems. Id.
Since there is no discussion of the 75 per centum provision, justification for that provision is specu-
lative.
140. 35 U.S.C. § 183.
141. Id.
2007)
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The statute 14 2 as written, however, allows a portion 43 of "just com-
pensation" to be withheld. This forces a claimant, in pursuing the bal-
ance of what is statutorily recognized as just compensation, to spend a
considerable amount of time and money in the courts. 1" One does not
have to be a skeptic to view this provision as little more than a liquidated
damages provision, but one subject to reimbursement if the claimant has
the patience, the money, and the evidence required to outlast the United
States in court.
45
While the Supreme Court has never explicitly stated what the
proper standard of review is for a takings claim, the Court has said that
'public use' is reviewed under the rational-basis review standard.'46
Congress, in codifying what appears to be no more than a penalty, fails
to meet even this standard.'47
There is only one other provision in all of federal law that codifies a
similar compensation scheme. 48  50 U.S.C. § 82 codifies certain war
powers of the United States. 149 Interestingly, this provision has not been
amended or otherwise addressed since 1917.150 Since the statute covers
commandeering of material for war, it would seem unlikely that the stat-
ute will receive any attention for at least the foreseeable future. There-
fore, this statute provides little or no guidance since, in addition to the
lack of Congressional interest in the statute, there are no recent cases
142. Id.
143. 25 percentum.
144. 35 U.S.C. § 183. There are, of course, no guarantees in the courts.
145. Provided one can overcome the evidentiary hurdles that await the claimant in court, as
discussed earlier. Furthermore, it is important to note that even if the plaintiff wins, a successful
plaintiff will not recover litigation costs. Weiss, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 125 (citing Constant v. United
States, I Cl. Ct. 600, 608 (Ct. Cl. 1982)).
146. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (U.S. 2005)(Kennedy, J. concurring).
147. Cf id. (Comparing the standards of review applicable to equal protection analysis and to
takings analysis). If the statute, etc. favors one side over the other, it fails this standard of review.
Id.
148. E.g., a certain amount is determined to be 'just compensation,' and if the original owner
disputes the amount offered, a suit may be brought to recover the remainder of what the original
owner believes he is owed.
149.
Whenever the United States shall cancel or modify any contract, make use of, assume,
occupy, requisition, or take over any factory or part thereof, or any ships or war material,
... it shall make just compensation therefor, to be determined by the President, and if the
amount thereof so determined by the President is unsatisfactory to the person entitled to
receive the same, such person shall be paid fifty per centum of the amount so determined
by the President and shall be entitled to sue the United States to recover such further sum
as added to said fifty per centum shall make up such amount as will be just compensa-
tion therefor...
50 U.S.C. § 82 (2006)
150. The year in which the statute was enacted. 39 Stat. 1192 (March 4, 1917, ch. 180).
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that address or even cite this statute. 151
C. Judicial Review of the Section 183 Compensation
Historically, plaintiffs pursuing judicial review of administrative
compensation under section 183"' have not fared well. If an inventor
exhausts his administrative remedies and complies with the statute of
limitations, the greatest challenge to overcome in a suit under section
183 is evidentiary.' 53 How does a claimant procure and show evidence
of damages? As discussed above, it is difficult for an Inventor to quan-
tify damages due to lost foreign filing rights and loss of commercial
gain. 5
4
These issues were addressed in Constant v. United States,155 in
which the plaintiff brought suit against the U.S. for five different types
of damages. 56 The court dismissed three of Constant's claims: the claim
for lost profits, the claim for "out-of-pocket business losses," and the
claim for damages for interference with his right to compete for failing
to prove actual damages.
57
The court also dismissed Constant's claim for damages resulting
from the delays in filing foreign patent applications. 58 The court ruled
that these delays also did not constitute actual damages. '5
Finally, the court also dismissed Constant's claim for damages re-
sulting from his attempts to have the secrecy orders rescinded. 60  The
court noted that "the Secrecy Act does not allow recovery of litigation
expenses.''
151. 50 U.S.C. § 82 was last cited in a case in 1941. United States v. International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, etc., 118 F.2d 684, 689 (2nd Cir. 1941).
152. 35 U.S.C. § 183.
153. This problem was recognized by Congress and apparently left to the courts to solve.
Hausken, supra note 1,210-13.
154. Obviously, these (prospective) gains are entirely speculative and are likely impossible to
prove in court.
155. Constant, 1 Cl. Ct. at 600.
156. Weiss, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 125 (citing Constant and explaining Constant's five claims of
damages: "(1) profits lost as a result of interference with business opportunities; (2) expenses in-
curred in attempts to obtain rescission of the secrecy order; (3) out-of-pocket business losses; (4)
damages for interference with [his) right to compete in the [relevant] market; and (5) damages re-
sulting from delays in filing foreign patent applications").
157. Id. (citing Constant, I Cl. Ct. at 602).
158. Id. (citing Constant, 1 Cl. Ct. at 609).
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing Constant, I Cl. Ct. at 608).
161. Id. As an aside, one may wonder how a 'just and fair' compensation provision can disal-
low litigation expenses when such expenses are required by the statutorily-mandated compensation
process (for dissatisfied claimants).
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It is important to note that a plaintiff suing under section 183162
has (or had) a patent application in a technology that "impact[s] national
security." '163 Therefore, it likely will be difficult to conduct the type of
discovery and hold to be so important. 64 The branch of government
dealing with such technology will likely resist discovery. 165 After all,
the records dealing with any technology pertinent to a suit under section
183166 will likely be classifiable at some security level.167
While courts have noted that the government must fairly compen-
sate a claimant,"' courts will not allow pre-trial discovery to jeopardize
national security."' In some cases, a claimant may rely on the in camera
review'70 of the government's evidence, presented by the government, to
show that the government did not comply with the statute.1 7' Whether
or not this process will provide a fair result is purely speculative 72 . One
thing is certain, such in camera proceedings are unlikely to get judicial
or scholarly review since the details of the proceedings are likely to re-
main secret. 17
3
Outside of the evidentiary procurement problems some claimants
162. 35 U.S.C. § 183.
163. 35 U.S.C. § 181.
164. See Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36, 44 (2nd Cir. 1958)(allowing an in camera trial
if it could be carried out without harming national security); Clift v. United States, 597 F.2d 826
(2nd Cir. 1979)(upholding the lower court's denial of the motion to compel production for reasons
of national security, but ruled that in camera production may be an option).
165. Id.
166. 35 U.S.C. § 183.
167. This is particularly true if the suit is brought under the first procedural option under Sec-
tion 183, i.e. the secrecy orders are still in effect. Even if not, why would a department want to sub-
ject itself to a judgment? Perhaps that technology is more important than previously thought (and
therefore merits a higher security level than thought before the suit was filed).
168. Farrand, 175 F.Supp. at 250 (noting that "the necessity for secrecy must not be so empha-
sized as to defeat the purpose of the state to encourage and protect inventors in their prop-
erty")(citing Halpern, 258 F.2d at 37).
169. See Halpern, 258 F.2d at 38 (allowing "Trial in camera, in which privilege relating to
state secrets may not be availed of by government, is permissible in suit under 35 U.S.C. § 183 if, in
judgment of district court, such trial can be carried out without substantial risk that secret informa-
tion will not be publicly divulged." Therefore, if the government believes that a substantial risk
exists, the trial in camera will not proceed); and see Cliff, 597 F.2d at 826 (Denying the motion to
compel discovery, and ordering the district court to conduct an in camera trial if it could be done
without jeopardizing national security), dissm 'd Clift v. United States, 808 F. Supp. at 101.
170. Id.
171. Meaning, the government did not adequately compensate the claimant under 35 U.S.C. §
183. Sometimes, the inventor will not even be allowed to participate in an in camera review of the
evidence. See Hausken, supra note 1, at 228 (citing Clift, 597 F.2d at 830, in which the court noted
that "in camera discovery would be futile.").
172. Will the government produce evidence that shows it did not fairly compensate the claim-
ant?
173. Therefore, public access to proceedings or holdings thereof is unlikely.
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face, quantifying the damages incurred is a similarly difficult task. Im-
position of secrecy orders will likely result in losses, e.g. lost foreign and
domestic opportunities. Even when these damages exist, they may be
impossible to prove or to adequately show. In proceedings under section
183,174 courts require a concrete showing of any claimed damages. 75
While requiring a concrete showing of damages is certainly fair,
there are losses that cannot be shown, quantified, or even known, that
directly result from governmental interference. While this author recog-
nizes and affirms the policy motivations behind such a requirement,
these motivations should be addressed by the statute or otherwise ad-
dressed at the judicial review stage.
Instead, losses are incurred by inventors for which "just compen-
sation" is never received.'76
V. FINAL THOUGHTS
There is little question that the public benefits from secrecy order
legislation. While the patent grant is part of the quid pro quo of the pat-
ent system, and the exercise of a constitutional power of congress, 177 na-
tional security must not be set back to advance the 'state of the art.'
Perhaps an occasional inventor must be set back instead of national se-
curity. While it would be ideal for the inventor and national security to
avoid setbacks, this is not a perfect world.
While a recognition of facts on the ground may dictate such an
174. 35 U.S.C. § 183.
175. Weiss, 37 Fed. Appx. at 523-524 ("The court does 'not allow purely speculative damages
but ... requires real concrete evidence of damages. "')(quoting Lear Siegler, Inc. v. United States,
225 Ct. Cl. 663, 665 (1981) and citing Constant v. United States, 617 F.2d 239, 244 (Ct. Cl. 1980));
Lear, 225 Ct. Cl. at 665 (denying summary judgment for plaintiff even as to liability on the ground
that "Section 183 requires plaintiff prove an injury and damages..."); Weiss, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 126
(remanding "the question [of] whether the plaintiff could show damages caused by the imposition of
a secrecy order" for further proceedings since [Plaintiffs] petition [did] not allege any potential
commercial use of the [invention]... if such non-government use can be established, as required by §
183, damages flowing from the secrecy order may conceivably be recovered." (quoting McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. United States, 670 F.2d 156 (Ct. Cl. 1982)).
176. Of course, the effects of secrecy orders may have some positive repercussions as well.
For example, the patent term is extended during the period of time the secrecy orders are in effect.
35 U.S.C. § 154. So, if the government is using the invention during this period of time, the inven-
tor will basically have free monopoly time outside of the patent term since only the government will
know about the invention. Hausken, supra note 1, at 242 ("During [this] period.. the inventor can
profit by marketing the invention to the government... [t]he truly successful inventor may actually
profit from the imposition of secrecy orders.") After the secrecy orders are lifted, the inventor's
patent term will begin and his ability to exclude others will continue for the full patent term. Id.
177. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to award "inventors the exclu-
sive right to their.., discoveries").
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undesirable outcome; i.e., that some inventors cannot (and therefore will
not) be adequately compensated; Congress could drastically improve the
compensation scheme by eliminating the "75 per centum" language from
35 U.S.C. § 183. Such an amendment would not discourage inventors
from entering into meaningful negotiations since inventors are already
motivated to settle without the threat posed by this provision (by the in-
stant gratification of 'cash in hand' and the threat of pending litigation
costs).
Congress should address this inadequacy of the Patent Act to ensure
that inventors, who concern themselves with advancing these arts so vi-
tal to our survival, are compensated fairly and expeditiously for their
work. While the interests of the public must prevail at times, the private
individual should be treated fairly as long as such treatment is possible.
A properly reworded section 183 could accomplish this goal without af-
fecting national security.
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